Economic Diplomacy: Lessons from Sri Lanka’s Role in the BRI

How Sri Lanka utilizes international law to recreate itself into a trading hub

Sri Lanka is seeking to establish itself as a trade hub and a gateway between East Asia and the burgeoning South Asian markets. Situated at the lower end of the sub-continent, Sri Lanka has several strategic advantages that it is utilizing to mold itself as the ‘pearl of the Indian ocean’ – a moniker provided by President of Xi Jinping, highlighting Sri Lanka’s increasing importance to Chinese ambitions.

Sri Lanka is central to Belt Road Initiative (“BRI”) the mammoth infrastructure development advanced by China to connect nations via land and sea in what amounts to be two trade and investment superhighways. However, Sri Lanka’s experience with the BRI is not as successful as what China and Sri Lanka hoped to be.

Crucially, Sri Lanka’s handling of the issues created by Chinese funds provide lessons for putative BRI nations as well as Sri Lanka. In fact, Sri Lanka economic policy has been informed by its experience with China. Sri Lanka, in pursuing its goal objective of creating a hub, must ensure that it is not wholly dependent on China, and diversify its risk exposure by attracting investments from other nations as well.

Additionally, the BRI could intensify existing governance problems, especially economic accountability and corruption. It could also help empower governments that have a poor track record on democracy, human rights, security and development.

The initiative also has long-term geopolitical implications; it increases political and economic dependencies. In this context, one must not forget that China's financial support in the BRI framework is primarily based on loans. As such, participation in BRI can produce a tremendous, unsustainable debt burden with disastrous consequences for the weaker economies. In light of this, Sri Lanka is launching a series of FTA negotiations with other nations, and thereby opening-up its economy.

Furthermore, it is also structurally reforming its economy and domestic regulatory framework to ensure ease of business for foreign companies and creating an investor-friendly framework. However, its experience with China and the BRI has made Sri Lanka careful. This caution is seen clearly in the lead-up to the negotiations and implementation of the Sri Lanka – Singapore Free Trade Agreement (“SL-SG FTA”). This will be addressed in Part 1 of this paper.

Whilst, the SL-SG FTA may reveal concerns that Sri Lankan government has, these are specific to Singapore and hence, do not encompass the wider lessons gleaned from Sri Lanka’s reception of the BRI. Part 2 will focus on the wider lessons gleaned from Chinese investments in Sri Lanka. Part 3 will apply those lessons to putative BRI countries and prescribe recommendation on how these nations may protect their interests.

SL-SG FTA

The SL-SG FTA was successfully concluded on January 2018[1] It was hailed as Sri Lanka’s first modern comprehensive FTA.[2] The FTA removes 80% of the tariff lines over goods and services being imported into Sri Lanka[3] from Singapore.

Whilst, Singapore is already a free-trade, open economy, Sri Lanka does not benefit so much from the direct export into Singapore, but rather Singapore is Sri Lanka’s gateway to the burgeoning ASEAN and East Asian markets.[4]  

With 28 FTAs with 32 trading partners,[5] Singapore is able to export to these countries with ease.[6] Sri Lanka aims to benefit from Singapore’s extensive network and serve as a complement to Singapore: Singapore being the hub for the East Asia will be complemented with Sri Lanka being a hub for South Asia.

Whilst, the overarching narrative of this partnership is heartily healthy. Sri Lanka’s cautious approach was seen and felt during the negotiations. In order to flesh out their concerns, we turn to the Articles of the FTA.

Negative List

The negotiations demonstrated the protectionist approach that Sri Lanka espouses in the wake of the BRI - negotiations were held up by the inability for Singapore and Sri Lanka to find common ground regarding the protection of certain industries.[7] Singapore wanted more a more open economy, but Sri Lanka desired to protect some industries.

Crucially, the industries that Sri Lanka wished to protect are import substitute industries, which would have been directly affected by Singapore’s main exports to Sri Lanka: petroleum products, machinery, electronic equipment, chemicals and plastic.[8] 

However, a compromise was reached in that Sri Lanka’s Negative List was reduced to 20% of the country’s tariff lines and contained sensitive items based on domestic considerations such as petroleum products, alcohol and tobacco.[9]

Sri Lanka’s negative list with Singapore is shorter than its negative list with China.[10] This indicates that China and Sri Lanka are relatively on similar patterns of production and thus, many Chinese exports to Sri Lanka are in competition to Sri Lanka’s domestic industries – import substitute industries.[11]

Furthermore, the shortened negative list signals Sri Lanka’s aim to avoid the predatory practices of its trading partners - an economic agenda to prevent a deepening of trade deficits - and therefore, forestall any attempt by China in leveraging this deficit to gain more concessions from China.

India in particular must factor into its regional economic calculus the risk of Sri Lanka losing its economic dependence to China. India may become vulnerable to Chinese exports, if China uses Sri Lanka as a manufacturing base, to circumvent the relevant rules of origins and thereby, allowing Chinese products into India, taking advantage of the lower tariffs between Sri Lanka and India.

Sri Lanka’s discerning differentiation of the negative lists between Singapore and China indicates that it is emulating Singapore’s growth strategy: creating an extensive network of tailor-made FTAs with trading partners.

By emulating Singapore’s strategy, Sri Lanka will be able to position itself as a hub for South Asia and act in complementarity with Singapore – the hub for ASEAN.[12]

It will also be able to diversify its risk against the economic dependence on China for FDI and for trade of goods and services. Furthermore, greater trade liberalization allows for Sri Lanka to maintain an overall trade surplus, as it will have many other trading partners. The trade surplus with these countries may offset its trade deficit with China.

Government Procurement (“GP”)

The FTA also includes Government Procurement, allowing Singapore businesses to compete for Sri Lankan government contracts and vice-versa,[13] although, this is the first time that Sri Lanka has included GP in its FTAs.[14]

Crucially, GP allows Singapore companies to bid for projects governed by Sri Lanka’s state-owned enterprises and large central entities.[15] The Government Procurement Chapter offers companies the assurance that international tenders for Government projects will be conducted fairly and transparently.[16]

This is aligned with Sri Lanka’s need to attract more countries to invest in its public infrastructure. Currently, Singapore, India and Japan have sought to develop the airport together.

Attracting a multitude of state investment partners is crucial to dilute China’s overreaching arm into Sri Lanka’s infrastructure. It also allows for creation of jobs for local industries, which were not seen in China’s port and economic zone investments.  

Chinese investment has only created a meagre amount of local employment; jobs that are too cost inefficient to import from China. Thus, the value extracted by local industries and labour is limited.

Most of the value generated by these investments are captured by since Chinese labour and supply companies. This is due to the fact that Chinese labour and materials are price-competitive relative to Sri Lanka’s local industries and Chinese investments utilize its own Chinese labour and materials.

Thus, Sri Lanka is exercising economic diplomacy to ensure that it becomes a regional trading hub, keeping in mind the economic imperative to extract more value for its own economy.

The crux of its economic diplomacy is to create an arena for competing countries, whilst diversifying its investment streams thereby preventing an over-reliance on the fortunes of any one country. The creation of a trading hub therefore, prevents any one country from dominating by reducing the potential influence these investor countries may have over Sri Lanka’s economy.

Safeguards and Dispute Resolution

Additionally, in pursuing an investor-friendly framework, the Investment Chapter of the FTA helps to attract more investments by providing investors with assurances that their investments will be protected.[17] Crucially, there are also safeguards against discriminatory treatment based on nationality and protection against expropriation[18] - Singaporean investors will be given national treatment and vice-versa.[19]

National treatment vis-à-vis FDI, ensures that foreign and domestic investors should be subjected to the same competitive and economic conditions in the host country market, and hence, Sri Lanka’s government will not impose measures that unduly favor domestic investors.[20]

Thus, by coupling protection of investments, ensuring that there will be same treatment between Singaporean and Sri Lankan investors and establishing a dispute resolution mechanism, the SL-SG FTA has created a framework where not only are investments protected but that there is a transparent measure to seek redress, both of which enhances the stability of Sri Lanka as an investment recipient.

Sri Lanka’s reception of the BRI – Lessons learnt

Sri Lanka has had a long-standing trade relationship with China, the latter investing heavily in Sri Lanka’s after the end of the civil war in 2009.[21] During the civil war, Chinese investments were welcomed warmly in Sri Lanka as Sri Lanka’s Western partners were distancing themselves from Sri Lanka due to its human rights violations.[22]

This relationship reached its zenith, when the Chinese started developing and building the Hambantota deep-water port – a flagship port.[23]

This port was built by a Chinese company as Sri Lanka did not have the necessary skills and expertise and were funded by Chinese loans.[24] The ballooning of Sri Lanka’s debt towards Chinese companies – amounting to US$ 8 billion[25] – resulted in the host state formally handing over 80% of its strategic port, Hambantota to China Merchants Port Holdings on a 99-year lease in an attempt to write-off  US$1.1 billion in debt.[26]

The handing over of the port has fueled the narrative, both in Sri Lanka and outside of it, that the BRI is a debt-trap[27] – designed to leverage recipient nations of Chinese funds into handing over strategic assets or natural resources.[28]

This seems to be an extension of China’s modus operandi in Africa, where the Chinese paid off African loans towards other countries in exchange for right to access natural resources.

Significantly, such incidences in Sri Lanka has raised questions about China’s true intentions and thus raised queries about the investment model of the BRI.[29] Unpacking this investment model is critical to understanding the true nature of the BRI and attendant consequences of partaking in it. There are three key aspects to the model:

A.    Type of investment

B.     Economic model

C.     Knock-on effects

Type of investment: Are they are debt trap?

Funding for BRI projects stem from two predominant sources: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”) and state-owned Chinese banks. The AIIB covers about 10% of funding whilst, the state-owned Chinese banks cover 90% of the funding.[30] Most of the financing are done via loans extended by these sources to nations that seek to participate in the BRI. These unconditional loans relative to the World Bank and other institutions, are readily accessible at a low- cost of borrowing.[31]

In fact, the Chinese government has been awarding investments in excess to the infrastructure needs of the BRI nations. This is a questionable practice given that the countries that receive these investments do not have the necessary infrastructure, know-how or economic means to have a large enough absorptive capacity to use these large loans from China.[32]

The lack of absorptive capacity means that not all the monies invested can be translated into productive means. A low absorptive capacity means a surplus of funds that cannot be put to good use, thereby creating unsustainable levels of debt. Unproductive use of this debt capital produces lower than expected returns for any investment, therefore, making them unprofitable. By providing cheap loans in excess to what is needed, China is making these countries become indebted to it.

Thus, misgivings about the rationale for Chinese generosity has increased. The high propensity for BRI nations to fall into the debt trap ensures the success of China’s alleged strategy.

Developing nations have limited alternatives - institutions like the World Bank impose strict conditions to loans, such as austerity measures or enacting certain laws, that may seem to encroach on the sovereignty of recipient nations[33] - to sources of funds for infrastructure investments and financing that seem to be unconditional. Chinese investment on the other hand has been historically less likely to require recipient countries to adhere to such conditions.[34]

Sri Lanka was one of those nations as its financing options were limited due to the human rights violations that were said to have been committed by Rajapakshe and his government.[35]

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that the developing countries of Asia collectively will require $26 trillion in infrastructure investment to sustain growth. Leveraging these needs against its considerable economic strength may ultimately garner China significant political gains.  

Notably, many of the areas targeted by China suffer from underinvestment due to domestic economic struggles and register low on the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). Myanmar and Pakistan – two countries heavily targeted by the BRI – rank 145th and 147th globally in terms of HDI.[36]

The attractiveness of Chinese loans as a pull factor coupled with underinvestment in certain countries as a push factor, drives BRI nations such as Sri Lanka to initially accept these loans.  

However, since these countries already lack the revenue to pay back these loans, the quantum may ratchet up to a point where – like in Sri Lanka – a debt-equity swap is agreed between China and the BRI nation. This may seem to be debt-trap in that China is seeking to gather strategic assets and resources by arranging for debt write-offs in the form of control or transfer of these resources.

BRI Investment Model

Although, the BRI has been hailed as a massive infrastructure project that would create jobs and economic prosperity in host countries, a stock-take of the current situation reveals a large disparity between reality and the marketed narrative. The BRI investment model seems to be designed to advance Chinese economic interests disproportionately relative to the host country’s interests. The lack of transparency in tendering for projects has led to the situation where China seems to be appropriating most of the value created by the BRI.[37]

Whilst, the Chinese seem to be publicly extolling the benefits for partner countries, reality seems to tell a different story - many of the potential benefits of BRI for China are less publicly articulated. China’s economy has slowed down and China’s State-owned Enterprises – such as cement, steel, and construction companies – have built up significant capacity (expanding factories and hiring workers) to serve the once booming domestic economy.[38] 

The BRI allows for these companies to export and thus, find productive uses for their resources. Additionally, China’s large reserve of savings - that is not being invested productively before the BRI – is now being invested in large-scale overseas infrastructure projects. Thus, China can export its excess savings and put its SOEs to work.[39]

However, while it seeks to look outwards to export its human capital and materials, China is aware that a massive infrastructure project creates value for host countries as well, in terms of jobs creation, and revenue generation for local industries. It can be argued that value created for the host country amounts to loss of value for China, especially in terms of revenue generation. To avoid this, value leakage, China is aiming to appropriate most of the value that generated from these investments.

This severely impacts the knock-off effects on the host country as jobs are not created. The BRI model can be summarized as China investing in other countries to create enclaves of Chinese labour, material and companies in those host countries and therefore, capture the value that is created by these investments. In other words, the BRI model seeks to repatriate most of the value created by the BRI investments, with only a small amount of value captured by the host countries – a reality that directly counters the BRI narrative.

Reports of job creation are only limited to industries that supply materials to the infrastructure development and only those that are cost effective to source from the local industries – which is rare since China’s goods are price competitive and it would be cheaper to import Chinese relative to sourcing them from local industries. In Sri Lanka, the Chinese model factors in jobs for the Chinese and less for local people.

This is a story that is being told from different countries, but with a common theme of how the Chinese bring in their own people and do not create local jobs. In Hambantota, the local people fear that they will not just lose their ancestral homes and their livelihoods—most are farmers or fishermen—they will also not get jobs in the giant projects that China is constructing on their land.

Additionally, Sri Lanka commissioned its second international airport in Mattala. Out of the USD 290 million construction costs, the Exim Bank of China put up USD 190 million with a concessionary loan. The Mattala airport is now known as the “world’s emptiest international airport” since it has only four regular flights arriving and departing per week.

This is consistent with the narrative that China’s model is exporting its excess supplies such as concrete and other construction materials outside of China. Furthermore, China’s lending institutions still earn interest fees on its loans. Thus, Chinese institutions do not have an incentive to build, create or construct infrastructure that creates any value or use to Sri Lanka. This allows for a proliferation of vanity projects in countries that receive China’s capital.

Similarly, in Africa, where the Chinese are heavily invested, media reports claim that even petty businesses like juice selling are now owned by them. Some economists have estimated that for every billion-dollar investment the Chinese bring in anywhere from 10-20,000 workers. In Pakistan, for such a bulky investment almost a million Chinese will relocate there. Media reports suggest that China is now an integral part of Pakistan’s cityscape.[40] 

Whilst, initially Sri Lanka welcomed the BRI investments, the failure to create a critical mass of job for locals, as well as the leasing its port - widely perceived as an infringement of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty – has resulted in protests from locals and a general reticence towards the BRI. Sri Lanka being one of the pioneer countries of the BRI served as a posterchild for the initiative. The problems that ensued therein serve as a warning sign to other potential BRI nations and investors, who should take precautions before they seek to partake in this nascent economic order.

Lessons for other BRI nations and investors

Beijing has not articulated the vision of the BRI into a proper roadmap, with measurable benchmarks, good governance and oversight.[41] BRI’s infrastructure development is not being done for an “inclusive good” for the region, rather it is being undertaken as an “exclusive good” that disproportionally benefits Beijing and their state-owned enterprises.[42]  Hence, investors and potential BRI nations should be wary regarding the lack of transparency of the BRI as well as the lack of value for non-Chinese investors. These two considerations may determine whether they should be part of the initiative.

Transparency is key

The BRI will need to prioritize transparency of its practices and open the development tender process to non-Chinese companies in a fair and open manner.[43] EU members are reticent in joining the BRI because there is a lack of concrete opportunities for European enterprises. Companies need predictability and transparency to apply for the project and ensure its sustainability. Investors need more certainty to get involved, and even though the Chinese genuinely wish to build a strong cooperation with the EU, but they are not willing to provide guarantees, Furthermore, tenders process must be regulated and results published for all states across the spectrum of the BRI – not just Chinese state-owned enterprises.[44]

The regulatory component is crucial here. It is imperative that the rules for doing business are transparent and aligned with international best practices to ensure that there must be an equal playing field.[45] Given that the AIIB and state-owned Chinese banks are the main financiers and they are both controlled by China, an independent board should be created is must to ensure that all companies have a fair chance of being awarded projects.[46] Additionally, access to information would be the first step toward bidding an inclusive and open tendering process.[47]

For instance, investors from the EU would find it easier to access to information regarding available projects if the EU and Asia were digitally connected through software infrastructure. The dissemination of information would allow other nations to participate and hence, more resources such as investment funds in the EU can be mobilised.[48]

Currently, private investors and companies do not know how to engage with BRI projects. It is suggested that as part of the software infrastructure an online portal could be designed where companies and investors could access to find tenders, thus, reducing transaction costs for companies in engaging in lengthy research - some companies even set up internal BRI task forces and still struggle to obtain information on how to get involved in certain projects.[49]

This would especially be useful for SMEs that lack resources. This is also aligned with international law, where there are international rules governing public procurement; e.g. the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.[50] Hence, the BRI can gain more credibility by adopting at least appropriate transparency procedures as a starting point to setup the tendering to be done.[51]

Specificity is key

It has been identified that the BRI lacks specificity, especially the lack of regulatory structures and enforcement measures. Recognition and protection of property rights, applicable standards and protocols are all necessary predicates for investor confidence.[52]

Thus, a framework that allows for these rights to be protected should be promulgated and entered between China and BRI nations.

Ensuring sustainable levels of debts

Excessive debt creates solvency issues with respect to nations. A country with a high Debt-to-GDP ratio would have a lower credit rating as compared to a country that does not have a similar ratio. A high Debt-to-GDP ratio may prevent countries from obtaining loans from international lending institutions, without strict conditions imposed, this creates a vicious cycle, where such countries will only borrow from China as they cannot borrow elsewhere and hence, become more indebted to China.

The Washington-based Centre for Global Development’s study of debt vulnerability of 63 countries concluded the BRI was likely to heighten the risks of a systematic debt problem across the region. In particular, small and relatively poor countries face a significantly increased risk of a sovereign debt default. This is further compounded by the fact that, the lead creditor of the BRI, China, has not signed to any international agreement or a set of rules when regarding inter-country lending and addressing debt problems when they arise. Thus, the risk of an unsustainable lending and defaults has increased manifold.

Many BRI nations are considered as developing nations and thus, when they borrow from China, it is easy to increase their Debt-to-GDP ratio, leading to skewed financial ratios that further impair their creditworthiness and ability to borrow from other supranational institutions or nations.

Thus, a transparent and sensible regional lending mechanism needs to be created and reinforced to prevent smaller nations to avoid debt traps like the BRI.[53] This can be done via a syndicated loan - countries and blocs like India, Japan, EU can come together to create loans to allow BRI nations to borrow from them. This allows greater attention and transparency towards sound financial stewardship regarding the procurement of infrastructure and the structure of loans and assistance.

Such a mechanism recognizes that whilst, infrastructure is necessary, there is a risk that countries within the BRI’s sphere of influence may become incapacitated if they became trapped in an unpayable debt predicament. Therefore, loans must be structured, and allocated in a manner that ensures fair and sustainable development without capitulating the region into economic vassals of Beijing.[54]

China may need to improve its debt practices soon. China is listed as an ad hoc participant of the Paris Club, a collection of creditor nations. Paris Club’s 22 permanent members, which do not include China, conducts negotiations with debtor countries that have difficulties repaying loans.

This is crucial because the BRI is being financing by debt and the solvency of debtor countries is integral to the adoption and success of the BRI. China should aim to become a permanent member of the Paris Club to boost its credibility and to ensure that its by reassessing its debt fueled BRI model would be sustainable in the long run.

Environmental Damage

Finally, it is important that BRI projects do not come at the cost of the environment in these regions. Projects done in East, Central and South Asia must not skirt around international standards on environmental protection and should be in accordance with the Paris Agreement.[55]

However, the BRI allows China to alienate its carbon footprint from its economic growth. Under the BRI, most of the nations that receive investment are developing nations – which means they have a greater need for China’s capital and less likely to have stringent environmental protections laws or weaker enforcement of the same - thus, China can outsource its carbon footprint, whilst retaining its economic growth.

China will be able to invest in non-renewables in BRI countries for instance, coal mines.[56] Thereby, creating sources of energy for its industries while maintaining its national emission numbers as the GHG emissions do not originate within their borders.

Conclusion

Sustainable development and growth comes from the marriage of transparency, prudent, responsible investment and international co-operation with international rules and obligations. This framework of rights and responsibilities must permeate throughout the BRI. Thus, the outcome of the BRI should be to achieve distributive justice in that there is fair distribution of value across all participants.

The BRI, if undertaken successfully, will change the landscape of global trade and investment flows. However, as with all large-scale phenomena, the effects of such an undertaking must be mapped and tracked to ensure that that the positive impact is maximized and the negative impacts are removed, reduced or mitigated.

Sri Lanka has been a petri dish for the BRI’s cultivation. It has allowed other nations and putative participants to take a step back, take stock of their own needs and evaluate the true value proportion. At the time of this paper, many countries have sought to renegotiate or have cancelled their projects with China. It is not this paper’s stance that the BRI was intended to be a trap nor was it created to produce economic vassalages. The events that followed in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and other countries gave rise to the aforementioned impressions. 

At best, the BRI is a framework that needs work and if implementing the suggestions set out in this paper would be helpful in creating a robust infrastructure investment program. As the aphorism goes, ‘All that glitters is not gold’ and this is verily true in respect of the BRI, in its current form.

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[1]Janaka Wijayasiri and Kithmina Hewage, “Sri Lanka – Singapore FTA: What it means for trade and investment flows” ECONOMYNEXT, (24 January 2018), available at http://www.economynext.com/Sri_Lanka_%E2%80%93_Singapore_FTA__What_it_means_for_trade_and_investment_flows-3-9663-2.html (26 February 2019).

[2]Ibid.

[3]Janaka Wijayasiri and Kithmina Hewage, “Sri Lanka – Singapore FTA: What it means for trade and investment flows” ECONOMYNEXT, (24 January 2018), available at http://www.economynext.com/Sri_Lanka_%E2%80%93_Singapore_FTA__What_it_means_for_trade_and_investment_flows-3-9663-2.html (26 February 2019).

[4]Lasanda Kurukulasuriya, “SL-Singapore FTA comes with Govt’s ‘Look East’ policy: What does it mean?” DAILY MIRROR, (29 January 2018), available at http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/SL-Singapore-FTA-comes-with-Govt-s-Look-East-policy-What-does-it-mean--144771.html (11 March 2019).

[5]Enterprise Singapore, “Singapore Free Trade Agreements” ENTERPRISE SINGAPORE, available at https://ie.enterprisesg.gov.sg/trade-from-singapore/international-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta (20 February 2019).

[6]Lasanda Kurukulasuriya, “SL-Singapore FTA comes with Govt’s ‘Look East’ policy: What does it mean?” DAILY MIRROR, (29 January 2018), available at http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/SL-Singapore-FTA-comes-with-Govt-s-Look-East-policy-What-does-it-mean--144771.html (11 March 2019).

[7]Chandeepa Wettasinghe, “SL-Singapore FTA first draft forwarded for Cabinet approval”, MIRRORCITIZEN, (3 January 2018), available at http://mirrorcitizen.dailymirror.lk/2018/01/03/sl-singapore-fta-first-draft-forwarded-for-cabinet-approval/ (10 March 2019).

[8]Chandeepa Wettasinghe, “SL-Singapore FTA first draft forwarded for Cabinet approval”, MIRRORCITIZEN, (3 January 2018), available at http://mirrorcitizen.dailymirror.lk/2018/01/03/sl-singapore-fta-first-draft-forwarded-for-cabinet-approval/ (10 March 2019).

[9]Janaka Wijayasiri and Kithmina Hewage, “Sri Lanka – Singapore FTA: What it means for trade and investment flows”, ECONOMYNEXT, (24 January 2018), available at http://www.economynext.com/Sri_Lanka_%E2%80%93_Singapore_FTA__What_it_means_for_trade_and_investment_flows-3-9663-2.html (26 February 2019).

[10]Saman Kelegama, “China – Sri Lanka FTA: Opportunities and Challenges”, INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES OF SRI LANKA, (15 July 2014), available at http://www.ips.lk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CH-SL-FTA.pdf (9 March 2019).

[11]Saman Kelegama, “China – Sri Lanka FTA: Opportunities and Challenges”, INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES OF SRI LANKA, (15 July 2014), available at http://www.ips.lk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CH-SL-FTA.pdf (9 March 2019).

[12]Janaka Wijayasiri and Kithmina Hewage, “Sri Lanka – Singapore FTA: What it means for trade and investment flows” ECONOMYNEXT, (24 January 2018), available at http://www.economynext.com/Sri_Lanka_%E2%80%93_Singapore_FTA__What_it_means_for_trade_and_investment_flows-3-9663-2.html (26 February 2019).

[13]Channel News Asia, “Singapore and Sri Lanka sign free trade agreement”, GOV.SG, (24 January 2018), available at https://www.gov.sg/news/content/channel-newsasia---singapore-and-sri-lanka-sign-free-trade-agreement (07 March 2020).

[14]Ibid.

[15]Channel News Asia, “Singapore and Sri Lanka sign free trade agreement”, GOV.SG, (24 January 2018), available at https://www.gov.sg/news/content/channel-newsasia---singapore-and-sri-lanka-sign-free-trade-agreement (07 March 2020).

[16]S. Iswaran, “Speech by Mr S Iswaran at the Sri Lanka Singapore Business Forum”, MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SINGAPORE, (24 January 2018), available at https://www.mti.gov.sg/Newsroom/Speeches/2018/01/Speech-by-Minister-Iswaran-at-the-Sri-Lanka-Singapore-Business-Forum (01 March 2020).

[17]S. Iswaran, “Speech by Mr S Iswaran at the Sri Lanka Singapore Business Forum”, MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY SINGAPORE, (24 January 2018), available at https://www.mti.gov.sg/Newsroom/Speeches/2018/01/Speech-by-Minister-Iswaran-at-the-Sri-Lanka-Singapore-Business-Forum (01 March 2020).

[18]Channel News Asia, “Singapore and Sri Lanka sign free trade agreement”, GOV.SG, (24 January 2018), available at https://www.gov.sg/news/content/channel-newsasia---singapore-and-sri-lanka-sign-free-trade-agreement (07 March 2020).

[19] Channel News Asia, “Singapore and Sri Lanka sign free trade agreement”, GOV.SG, (24 January 2018), available at https://www.gov.sg/news/content/channel-newsasia---singapore-and-sri-lanka-sign-free-trade-agreement (07 March 2020).

[20]United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “National Treatment”, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, (1999), available at https://unctad.org/en/Docs/psiteiitd11v4.en.pdf (03 March 2020).

[21]Simon Mundy, “China-backed port sparks Sri Lanka sovereignty”, FINANCIAL TIMES, (24 October 2017), available at https://www.ft.com/content/f8262d56-a6a0-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97 (04 March 2020).

[22]Simon Mundy, “China-backed port sparks Sri Lanka sovereignty”, FINANCIAL TIMES, (24 October 2017), available at https://www.ft.com/content/f8262d56-a6a0-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97 (04 March 2020).

[23]Yogita Limaye, “Sri Lanka: A country trapped in debt”, BBC NEWS, (26 May 2017), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40044113 (02 March 2020).

[24]Yogita Limaye, “Sri Lanka: A country trapped in debt”, BBC NEWS, (26 May 2017), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40044113 (02 March 2020).

[25]Kai Schultz, “Sri Lanka , Struggling With Debt, Hands a Major Port to China”, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (12 December 2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html?mtrref=www.google.com.sg (05 February 2020).

[26]Simon Mundy, “China-backed port sparks Sri Lanka sovereignty”, FINANCIAL TIMES, (24 October 2017), available at https://www.ft.com/content/f8262d56-a6a0-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97 (04 March 2020).

[27]Yogita Limaye, “Sri Lanka: A country trapped in debt”, BBC NEWS, (26 May 2017), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40044113 (02 March 2020).

[28]Yogita Limaye, “Sri Lanka: A country trapped in debt”, BBC NEWS, (26 May 2017), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40044113 (02 March 2020).

[29]Simon Mundy, “China-backed port sparks Sri Lanka sovereignty”, FINANCIAL TIMES, (24 October 2017), available at https://www.ft.com/content/f8262d56-a6a0-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97 (04 March 2020).

[30]ACCA et al. “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Reshaping the Global

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